David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630 (1990)
What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to Searle, they have no ontological status - they are simply ways of describing some interesting facets of purely physiological phenomena.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alison Gopnik (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1.
W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea (1993). Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
Alvin I. Goldman (1993). Functionalism, the Theory-Theory and Phenomenology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101.
Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (1993). The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60.
Brian Loar (1993). Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58.
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