Motivation by ideal

Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89 – 103 (2002)
Abstract
I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things.
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    References found in this work BETA
    J. David Velleman (1999). A Rational Superego. Philosophical Review 108 (4):529-558.
    J. David Velleman (1999). A Rational Superego. Philosophical Review 108 (4):529 - 558.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Donald W. Bruckner (2011). Silent Prudence. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):349-364.
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