Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173 (1999)
| Abstract | O'Brien & Opie defend a “vehicle” rather than a “process” theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is “explicit.” I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesWilliam G. Lycan (1995). A Limited Defense of Phenomenal Information. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
Bram van Heuveln & Eric Dietrich (1999). Brute Association is Not Identity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):171-171.
Liane Gabora (2002). Amplifying Phenomenal Information: Toward a Fundamental Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):3-29.
Annie Vinter & Pierre Perruchet (1999). What About Consciousness During Learning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):173-173.
Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez (1999). Stability and Explicitness: In Defense of Implicit Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):151-152.
Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual Information Processing and Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads7 ( #133,587 of 549,520 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,520 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
