In David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press (2000)
|Abstract||This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics|
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