David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61 (1985)
“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation of morals. This new edition of _Practical Reflection_ contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science. _ _ _ _.
|Keywords||Act Agent Reasoning|
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|ISBN(s)||9781575865348 0691073376 (alk. paper)|
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Susanne Mantel (2014). No Reason for Identity: On the Relation Between Motivating and Normative Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.
Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
David Enoch (2011). Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism About Practical Reason? Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):319-339.
Alison Fernandes (forthcoming). Varieties of Epistemic Freedom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
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