The limits of neuropsychological models of consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703 (1995)
This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00040681
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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P. Cicogna & M. Bosinelli (2001). Consciousness During Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.
Max Velmans (1996). Consciousness and the "Causal Paradox". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542.

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