What Happens When Someone Acts?

Mind 101 (403):461-481 (1992)
Abstract
What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive J. David Velleman, What Happens When Someone Acts?
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Michael Garnett (2013). Taking the Self Out of Self-Rule. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33.
Jennifer Hornsby (2012). Actions and Activity. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.

View all 46 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
Jeffrey Hause (2006). Aquinas on Non-Voluntary Acts. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):459-475.
Hugh McCann (1995). Intention and Motivational Strength. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
Jennifer Hornsby (2004). Agency and Alienation. Ch. In _Naturalism in Question_. Eds. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (Harvard UP):173-87.
Donald Davidson (1970). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

1,103 ( #298 of 1,911,608 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

253 ( #297 of 1,911,608 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.