David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):473-486 (2009)
A natural starting place for developing a phylogenetic species concept is to examine monophyletic groups of organisms. Proponents of “the” Phylogenetic Species Concept fall into one of two camps. The first camp denies that species even could be monophyletic and groups organisms using character traits. The second groups organisms using common ancestry and requires that species must be monophyletic. I argue that neither view is entirely correct. While monophyletic groups of organisms exist, they should not be equated with species. Instead, species must meet the more restrictive criterion of being genealogically exclusive groups where the members are more closely related to each other than to anything outside the group. I carefully spell out different versions of what this might mean and arrive at a working definition of exclusivity that forms groups that can function within phylogenetic theory. I conclude by arguing that while a phylogenetic species concept must use exclusivity as a grouping criterion, a variety of ranking criteria are consistent with the requirement that species can be placed on phylogenetic trees.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
Joel Cracraft (1983). Species Concepts and Speciation Analysis. In R. F. Johnston (ed.), Current Ornithology. Plenum Press. 159-87.
Richard Dawkins (2004). The Ancestor's Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Evolution. Houghton Mifflin.
Kevin De Queiroz & Michael J. Donoghue (1988). Phylogenetic Systematics and the Species Problem. Cladistics 4:317-38.
John Dupr'E. (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Harvard University Press.
Marc Ereshefsky (1992). Eliminative Pluralism. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):671-690.
Citations of this work BETA
Joel D. Velasco (2010). Species, Genes, and the Tree of Life. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):599-619.
Matthew J. Barker & Joel D. Velasco (2014). Deep Conventionalism About Evolutionary Groups. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):971-982.
Similar books and articles
John S. Wilkins (2003). How to Be a Chaste Species Pluralist-Realist: The Origins of Species Modes and the Synapomorphic Species Concept. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):621-638.
Joel D. Velasco (2008). Species Concepts Should Not Conflict with Evolutionary History, but Often Do. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 39 (4):407-414.
Christopher D. Horvath (1997). Discussion: Phylogenetic Species Concept: Pluralism, Monism, and History. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):225-232.
Joel Cracraft (1987). Species Concepts and the Ontology of Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):329-346.
Hugh Lehman (1967). Are Biological Species Real? Philosophy of Science 34 (2):157-167.
Kirk Fitzhugh (forthcoming). Species as Explanatory Hypotheses: Refinements and Implications. Acta Biotheoretica.
Mark Ridley (1989). The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
L. R. Franklin (2007). Bacteria, Sex, and Systematics. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):69-95.
Mark Wilkinson (1990). A Commentary on Ridley's Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):433-446.
Brent D. Mishler & Robert N. Brandon (1987). Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept. Biology and Philosophy 2 (4):397-414.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads53 ( #25,182 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?