David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal of Psychology 90 (4):543-566 (1999)
The study of preconscious versus conscious processing has an extensive history in cognitive psychology, dating back to the writings of William James. Much of the experimental work on this issue has focused on perception, conceived of as input analysis, and on the relation of consciousness to attentional processing. The present paper examines when input analysis becomes conscious from the perspectives of cognitive modelling, methodology, and a more detailed understanding of what is meant by "conscious processing." Current evidence suggests that perception becomes conscious at a late-arising stage of focal-attentive processing concerned with information integration and dissemination. Reliable criteria for determining when perception becomes conscious combine the evidence of "first-person," phenomenological reports with "third-person" functional dissociations between preconscious and conscious processing. There are three, distinct senses in which a process may be said to be "conscious." It might be "conscious" (a) in the sense that one is conscious of the process, (b) in the sense that the operation of the process is accompanied by consciousness (of its results) and (c) in the sense that consciousness enters into or causally influences the process. Consciousness of familiar stimuli, rather than entering into input analysis, appears to follow it, in human information processing. Processes closely associated with the appearance of consciousness such as information integration and dissemination appear to operate unconsciously. Consequently, perception appears to be "conscious" only in sense (b)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Axel Cleeremans (2006). Time, Action, and Consciousness. Human Movement Science.
Jean-Pierre Changeux, Stanislas Dehaene, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackura & Claire Sergenta (2006). Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
Pentti O. A. Haikonen (2007). Essential Issues of Conscious Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):72-84.
Max Velmans (2003). Preconscious Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.
David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
Riccardo Manzotti (2006). A Process Oriented View of Conscious Perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):7-41.
Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #30,586 of 1,100,864 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #289,727 of 1,100,864 )
How can I increase my downloads?