Content, context and care in environmental ethics

Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 4 (7):38-42 (2013)
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Abstract

Em questões ambientais, a relação dos seres humanos com a natureza é vista como um problema ético importante. Isso gerou várias posições éticas como antropocentrismo, biocentrismo, ecocentrismo e similares. Sobre a relação do homem com o animal, B. G. Nortor menciona que animais em “contexto” devem ter prioridade em relação a animais em “conteúdo”. Norton nomeia animais domesticados e animais selvagens mantidos em cativeiros como animais em “contexto”. Ele sustenta que devemos cuidar dos animais domesticados na medida em que temos um contrato hipotético com eles (Norton, 2003). Ao mesmo tempo em que concordamos com a posição de Norton de cuidar dos animais domesticados, defendemos que sua compreensão do contrato e sua subsequente compreensão de “cuidado” como derivando de um valor instrumental dos animais reflete sua posição de um antropocentrismo fraco. Neste artigo, defendemos que uma ética do “cuidado” é mais significativa quando emerge de uma perspectiva não-antropocêntrica que trate o outro como valioso intrinsecamente.: In environment related issues, the relationship of human beings to nature is seen as an important ethical issue. This issue has resulted in various ethical positions like anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism and like. On man’s relationship with animal beings, Bryan G. Norton mentions that animals in ‘context’ should be given priority over animals in ‘content’. Norton brings the domesticated animals and captive bred wild animals under the ‘context’ animals. Norton maintains that we should take care of the domesticated animals as we have a hypothetical contract with them. (Norton, Searching for Sustainability: Interdisciplinary Essays in the Philosophy of Conservation Biology, 2003) While we agree to Norton’s position of taking care of the domesticated animals, we maintain that his understanding of contract and his subsequent understanding of ‘care’ as stemming from an instrumental value of animals reflects his position of weak-anthropocentrism. In this paper, we claim that a ‘care’ based ethics is more meaningful when it emerges from a non-anthropocentric perspective that treat the other as intrinsically valued. Keywords : Content, Context, Intrinsic Value, Instrumental value, Pragmatism, Animal Care

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Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Susan J. Armstrong & Richard George Botzler.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2004 - Univ of California Press.
The case for animal rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
The ethics of care: personal, political, and global.Virginia Held - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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