David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116 (2008)
This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice.
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
Elizabeth Anderson (1993). Value in Ethics and Economics. Harvard University Press.
Ruth Chang (ed.) (1997). Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
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