David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 64 (1):79-106 (2010)
The paper argues for a decompositionalist account of lexical concepts. In particular, it presents and argues for a cluster decompositionalism, a view that claims that the complexes a token of a word corresponds to on a given occasion are typically built out of a determinate set of basic concepts, most of which are present on most other occasions of use of the word. The first part of the paper discusses some explanatory virtues of decompositionalism in general. The second singles out cluster decompositionalism as the best explanation of the variability of meaning. The third part is devoted to responding to some problems.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
R. Carston (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Blackwell.
Gregory L. Murphy (2004). The Big Book of Concepts. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Agustin Vicente (2012). On Travis Cases. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (1):3-19.
Similar books and articles
Bradley Rives (2009). The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists. Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
John Collins (2011). Impossible Words Again: Or Why Beds Break but Not Make. Mind and Language 26 (2):234-260.
Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1999). Impossible Words? Linguistic Inquiry 30:445-453.
Vyvyan Evans (2009). How Words Mean: Lexical Concepts, Cognitive Models, and Meaning Construction. Oxford University Press.
Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2001). Why Compositionality Won't Go Away: Reflections on Horwich's 'Deflationary' Theory. Ratio 14 (4):350–368.
Graeme Hirst (1999). What Exactly Are Lexical Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):45-46.
Nicholas Adamson (2000). Concepts and Nativism. Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
Ken Daley (2010). The Structure of Lexical Concepts. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):349 - 372.
Richard Horsey (2000). Meaning Postulates and Deference. Philosophical Explorations.
Added to index2010-04-29
Total downloads162 ( #24,355 of 1,938,585 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #24,464 of 1,938,585 )
How can I increase my downloads?