Can Partial Structures Accommodate Inconsistent Science?
Principia 13 (2):233-250- (2009)
| Abstract | The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst philosophers of science. One of the foremost strains of this approach-the model-theoretic approach (MTA)-is to represent scientific theories as families of models, all of which satisfy or 'make true' a given set of constraints. However some autho.rs (Brown 2002, Frisch 2005) have criticised the approach on the grounds that certain scientific theories are logically inconsistent, and there can be no models of an inconsistent set of constraints. Thus it would seem that the MTA fails to represent inconsistent scientific theories at all, and this raises concerns about the way it represents in general. In a series of papers (1990, 1993, 1995) and a recent book (2003) da Costa and French have developed a variant of the MTA approach which they call 'partial structures', and which they claim can accommodate inconsistent theories. I assess this claim, looking to two theories which have been called 'inconsistent': Bohr's theory of the atom and classical electrodynamics | |||||||||
| Keywords | Representation Bohr Theories Inconsistency Classical electrodynamics Partial structures | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMark Colyvan (2008). The Ontological Commitments of Inconsistent Theories. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):115 - 123.
Bryson Brown (1992). Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:397 - 411.
Ronald N. Giere (1994). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 61 (2):276-296.
Steven French (2000). Models, Theories, and Structures: Thirty Years On. Philosophy of Science 67 (S1):S116-.
Steven French (2003). A Model‐Theoretic Account of Representation (or, I Don't Know Much About Art…but I Know It Involves Isomorphism). Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1472-1483.
Otavio Bueno & Newton da Costa (2007). Quasi-Truth, Paraconsistency, and the Foundations of Science. Synthese 154 (3):383 - 399.
Dilip B. Madan (1983). Inconsistent Theories as Scientific Objectives. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):453-470.
Newton da Costa & Steven French (2000). Models, Theories, and Structures: Thirty Years On. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):127.
Otavio Bueno & Steven French (2011). How Theories Represent. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):857-894.
Mathias Frisch (2004). Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):525-549.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-06-21Total downloads20 ( #61,442 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
