La relatividad lingüística en Los tiempos Del mentalés

Theoria 18 (1):87-106 (2003)
Abstract
En este artículo reevaluamos la tesis de la relatividad lingüística tomando corno referencia la vision de la mente que Fodor ha venido ofreciendo. Partiendo de su argumento clásico a favor del lenguaje del pensamiento, veremos como el desarrollo de su tesis de la modularidad y de su mas reciente teoria psicosemántica (el atomismo informacional), permiten compatibilizar su posición con, al menos, una variedad de relatividad, la relatividad léxica. Así mismo, examinaremos su ultimo argumento en favor de la prioridad explicativa del pensamiento, basado en la composicionalidad que éste exhibe, a diferencia del lenguaje.This paper reevaluates the thesis of linguistic relativity in the context of Fodor’s views on the nature of mind. We begin with Fodor’s classical argument for the language of thought, and follow the development of his ideas as he adds a general account of the structure of mind (the modulariry thesis) and a psychosemantical theory (informational atomism). Finally, we examine his most recent altempt to support the explanatory prioriry of thought, based on the compositionaliry that thought, but not language, exhibits. We argue that Fodor’s position is compatible a variety of lexical relativiry
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