David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (1):3-19 (2012)
Charles Travis has been forcefully arguing that meaning does not determine truth-conditions for more than two decades now. To this end, he has devised ingenious examples whereby different utterances of the same prima facie non-ambiguous and non-indexical expression type have different truth-conditions depending on the occasion on which they are delivered. However, Travis does not argue that meaning varies with circumstances; only that truth-conditions do. He assumes that meaning is a stable feature of both words and sentences. After surveying some of the explanations that semanticists and pragmaticians have produced in order to account for Travis cases, I propose a view which differs substantially from all of them. I argue that the variability in the truth-conditions that an utterance type can have is due to meaning facts alone. To support my argument, I suggest that we think about the meanings of words (in particular, the meanings of nouns) as rich conceptual structures; so rich that the way in which a property concept applies to an object concept is not determined
|Keywords||Meaning Truth-conditions Occasion-sensitivity Conceptual semantics Semantic knowledge World knowledge|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Susan Carey (2009). The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
R. Carston (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Blackwell.
D. Sperber & D. Wilson (1995). Relevance. Blackwell.
Ray Jackendoff (2002). Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford University Press Uk.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Giberman (2016). Moving Parts: A New Indexical Treatment of Context-Shifting Predication. Synthese 193 (1):95-124.
Alex Davies (2014). Off-Target Responses to Occasion-Sensitivity. Dialectica 68 (4):499-523.
Similar books and articles
Charles Travis (2008). Occasion-Sensitivity: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
Anne Bezuidenhout (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Noûs 36 (s16):105 - 134.
Anne Bezuidenhout (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):105-134.
Stefano Predelli (2011). Sub-Sentential Speech and the Traditional View. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (6):571-588.
Daniel Whiting (2011). Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.
C. Travis (1996). Meaning's Role in Truth. Mind 105 (419):451-466.
Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Radical and Moderate Pragmatics: Does Meaning Determine Truth Conditions? In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press
Ulvi Doğuoğlu (2007). Sense and Sensitivity. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:59-67.
D. E. Over (1981). Game Theoretical Semantics and Entailment. Studia Logica 40 (1):67 - 74.
Howard Simmons (1997). Circumstances and the Truth of Words: A Reply to Travis. Mind 106 (421):117-118.
Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
Nicla Vassallo & Claudia Bianchi (2007). Meaning, Contexts and Justification. In D. C. Richardson B. Kokinov (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. Springer 69--81.
Added to index2012-05-08
Total downloads241 ( #10,417 of 1,907,366 )
Recent downloads (6 months)33 ( #23,498 of 1,907,366 )
How can I increase my downloads?