Rethinking the presumption of innocence

Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (2):193-213 (2007)
This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable
Keywords Presumption of innocence  Democracy  Human rights  Fair trial  Reverse burden of proof
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    R. A. Duff (2014). Towards a Modest Legal Moralism. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235.

    View all 6 citations

    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    37 ( #39,215 of 1,088,616 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,936 of 1,088,616 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.