David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (2):193-213 (2007)
This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable
|Keywords||Presumption of innocence Democracy Human rights Fair trial Reverse burden of proof|
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References found in this work BETA
Victor Tadros (2005). Criminal Responsibility. OUP Oxford.
Paul Roberts (2005). Strict Liability and the Presumption of Innocence: An Exposé of Functionalist Assumptions. In Andrew Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict Liability. OUP Oxford
R. A. Duff (2005). Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence. In Andrew Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict Liability. OUP Oxford
R. A. Duff (2002). Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):97–108.
Citations of this work BETA
R. A. Duff (2014). Towards a Modest Legal Moralism. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235.
Hamish Stewart (2014). The Right to Be Presumed Innocent. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):407-420.
Douglas Husak (2014). Social Engineering as an Infringement of the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of Corporate Criminality. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):353-369.
Victor Tadros (2007). Distinguishing General Theory, Doctrine and Evidence in Criminal Responsibility: A Response to Lacey. Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (3):259-265.
Sune Lægaard (2015). Burqa Ban, Freedom of Religion and ‘Living Together’. Human Rights Review 16 (3):203-219.
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