Some remarks on coherence and subjective probability

Philosophy of Science 32 (1):32-38 (1965)
The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief
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DOI 10.1086/288025
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