The Dual "Explanandum" Strategy (La estrategia del doble explanandum)

Critica 34 (101):73 - 96 (2002)
In this paper I try to fix the price that a non-epiphenomenal dualism demands. To begin with, the defender of non-epiphenomenal dualism cannot hold that mental events cause physical events, since the physical world is causally closed. Hence, she must say that mental events cause events that are not physical, or at least, events that are not affected by the principle of the causal closure of the physical world (this is the "dual explanandum strategy"). However, this is not all: the events mental causes bring about must fulfill certain further conditions, which I spell out. When properly analyzed, it will be seen that these conditions make the dual explanandum strategy highly demanding. /// En este artículo trato de fijar el precio que un dualismo no epifenomènico tiene que pagar. Para empezar, el defensor del dualismo no epifenomenico no puede mantener que los eventos mentales causan cambios en el mundo fisico, ya que èste está causalmente cerrado. Por lo tanto, ha de decir que los eventos mentales causan eventos que no son fisicos, o, al menos, que no están sometidos al principio del cierre causal del mundo fisico (èsta es la "estrategia del doble explanandum"). Sin embargo, esto no es todo: los eventos que son efectos de las causas mentales tienen que cumplir ciertas condiciones ulteriores, condiciones que detallo. Cuando èstas se analizan propiamente, se ve que vuelven muy exigente la estrategia del doble explanandum.
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