The role of dispositions in explanations

Theoria 19 (3):301-310 (2004)
Abstract
According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional predicates, or concepts, can be legitimately used in causal explanations, but such a use is not necessary. For every explanation couched in dispositional terms, there is always a better, and complete, explanation that makes use of a different vocabulary, that of categorial bases. In what follows, I will develop this view, and then argue that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall within this model. That is, I will argue that we would miss some explanations if we were to forsake dispositional concepts and dispositional explanations
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