Self knowledge and knowing other minds: The implicit / explicit distinction as a tool in understanding theory of mind
British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155 (2012)
|Abstract||Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads to a distinction between different levels of implicitness. Postulating these different levels, it is argued, allows us to make better sense of the empirical literature on early false belief task abilities.|
|Keywords||implicit/explicit false belief task consciousness intentional action deliberation|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ted Ruffman (1999). Applying the Implicit-Explicit Distinction to Development in Children. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):783-783.
David Kirsh (2009). Knowledge, Implicit Vs Explicit. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Cambridge.
David Kirsh (2009). Knowledge, Explicit Vs Implicit. Oxford Companion to Consciousness:397-402.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). What's Doing the Work Here: Knowledge Representation or the HOT Theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):778-9.
John R. Vokey & Philip A. Higham (1999). Implicit Knowledge as Automatic, Latent Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):787-788.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). What's Really Doing the Work Here? Knowledge Representation or the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):778-779.
Kristina Musholt (2012). Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84:63-89.
Greg Sax (2010). Having Know-How: Intellect, Action, and Recent Work on Ryle's Distinction Between Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):507-530.
Nicolas Georgieff & Yves Rossetti (1999). How Does Implicit and Explicit Knowledge Fit in the Consciousness of Action? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):765-766.
Robert F. Hadley (1995). The 'Explicit-Implicit' Distinction. Minds and Machines 5 (2):219-42.
Niels A. Taatgen (1999). Implicit Versus Explicit: An ACT-R Learning Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):785-786.
Axel Cleeremans, Fishing with the Wrong Nets: How the Implicit Slips Through the Representational Theory of Mind.
Jason Low & Bo Wang (2011). On the Long Road to Mentalism in Children's Spontaneous False-Belief Understanding: Are We There Yet? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):411-428.
Flavia Santoianni (2011). Educational Models of Knowledge Prototypes Development. Mind and Society 10 (2):103-129.
Peter A. Bibby & Geoffrey Underwood (1999). Volitional Control in the Learning of Artificial Grammars. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):757-758.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-09-30
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?