David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Brandl Beran (ed.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. 279 (2012)
Humans seem special, because they are able to think about thinking (to make their mentality the object of their thoughts). In this paper I distinguish two very different ways in which thinking about thinking could be understood and which role these understandings play in the control of the mind. I argue on the one hand that language enables humans to express and attend to the content of their thoughts. This is an incredibly powerful tool which allows for the intentional manipulation of content. On the other hand, however, this form of thinking about thinking does not require the agent to understand mental states as states and because of that it does not allow for the intentional targeting of the states. Only a second and metarepresentation based form of thinking about thinking allows for this control. the rest of the paper then discusses the possible function of the intentional control of the mind in future directed self control.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tillmann Vierkant (2013). Mental Muscles and the Extended Will. Topoi 33 (1):1-9.
Similar books and articles
Joëlle Proust (2007). Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.
Tillmann Vierkant & Andreas Paraskevaides (2012). Mindshaping and the Intentional Control of the Mind. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction. John Benjamins.
Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 474--493.
George Seli (2012). The Utility of Conscious Thinking on Higher-Order Theory. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):303 - 316.
Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
Kal Alston (2001). Re/Thinking Critical Thinking: The Seductions of Everyday Life. Studies in Philosophy and Education 20 (1):27-40.
Cara Spencer (2007). Unconscious Vision and the Platitudes of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):309 – 327.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1990). Practical Thinking, Reasons for Doing, and Intentional Action: The Thinking of Doing and the Doing of Thinking. Philosophical Perspectives 4:273-308.
Wolfgang Wildgen & Barend van Heusden (eds.) (2009). Metarepresentation, Self-Organization and Art. Peter Lang.
David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 153--181.
David Hunter (2003). Is Thinking an Action? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):133-148.
Added to index2011-11-25
Total downloads5 ( #255,653 of 1,410,002 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #176,758 of 1,410,002 )
How can I increase my downloads?