David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213 - 224 (2008)
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is: our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
|Keywords||Ethical naturalism Moral disagreement Moral realism Open question argument Theory of direct reference Twin Earth|
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References found in this work BETA
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press 181-228.
G. E. Moore (1903). Principia Ethica. Dover Publications.
Gilbert Harman (1977). The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jorn Sonderholm (2013). Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument. Theoria 79 (1):76-88.
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