The Ontology of Products

Metaphysica 11 (1):1-16 (2010)
We speak of products in two senses: in one, we speak of types of products, in the other we speak of the particular objects that are instances of those types. I argue that types of products have the same ontological status as that of material stuffs, like water and gold, which have a non-particular level of existence. I also argue that the relationship between types of products and their instances is logically similar to the relation of constitution, which holds between, say, gold and a ring made of gold. In my approach, types of products are concrete entities, having spatiotemporal properties. This picture fits our commonplace conception of types of products better than alternative approaches according to which types of products are universal, abstract, or mereological entities
Keywords Ontology  Product  Type  Instance
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-009-0053-3
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George Boolos (1985). Nominalist Platonism. Philosophical Review 94 (3):327-344.

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