David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23 (2000)
The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued that the principle of alternate possibilities is false. I argue that Frankfurt's argument rests on a modal fallacy
|Keywords||Ethics Foreknowledge Freedom Responsibility Frankfurt, H|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Ezio Di Nucci (2011). Frankfurt Versus Frankfurt: A New Anti-Causalist Dawn. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):117-131.
Simon Kittle (2014). Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-Decisional’ Intervention. Philosophia 42 (4):987-997.
Greg Janzen (forthcoming). 'Brain-Malfunction' Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
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