European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1) (2012)
|Abstract||In Chapter 7 of The Varieties of ReferenceEvans implicitly outlines a view to the effect that bodily awareness plays no role in perceptual self-location or in the specification of our perceptual perspective of the world. In this paper I discuss this story and offer an alternative proposal. Then I explore some consequences of this account for our understanding of the elusiveness of the self in perceptual experience|
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