Philosophy of Science 63 (3):263 (1996)
|Abstract||Quine and Putnam argued for mathematical realism on the basis of the indispensability of mathematics to science. They claimed that the mathematics that is used in physical theories is confirmed along with those theories and that scientific realism entails mathematical realism. I argue here that current theories of confirmation suggest that mathematics does not receive empirical support simply in virtue of being a part of well confirmed scientific theories and that the reasons for adopting a realist view of scientific theories do not support realism about mathematical entities, despite the use of mathematics in formulating scientific theory|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Anthony Peressini (1999). Confirming Mathematical Theories: An Ontologically Agnostic Stance. Synthese 118 (2):257-277.
Otávio Bueno (2003). Quine's Double Standard: Undermining the Indispensability Argument Via the Indeterminacy of Reference. Principia 7 (1-2):17-39.
Chris Pincock (2007). A Role for Mathematics in the Physical Sciences. Noûs 41 (2):253-275.
Anthony Peressini (1999). Applying Pure Mathematics. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):13.
Jacob Busch (2011). Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.
Michael Resnik (1995). Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #32,626 of 722,751 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,751 )
How can I increase my downloads?