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- Nicole A. Vincent (2005). Compensation for Mere Exposure to Risk. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 29:89-101.It could be argued that tort law is failing, and arguably an example of this failure is the recent public liability and insurance (‘PL&I’) crisis. A number of solutions have been proposed, but ultimately the chosen solution should address whatever we take to be the cause of this failure. On one account, the PL&I crisis is a result of an unwarranted expansion of the scope of tort law. Proponents of this position sometimes argue that the duty of care owed by defendants to plaintiffs has expanded beyond reasonable levels, such that parties who were not really responsible for another’s misfortune are successfully sued, while those who really were to blame get away without taking any responsibility. However people should take responsibility for their actions, and the only likely consequence of allowing them to shirk it is that they and others will be less likely to exercise due care in the future, since the deterrents of liability and of no compensation for accidentally self-imposed losses will not be there. Others also argue that this expansion is not warranted because it is inappropriately fueled by ‘deep pocket’ considerations rather than by considerations of fault. They argue that the presence of liability insurance sways the judiciary to award damages against defendants since they know that insurers, and not the defendant personally, will pay for it in the end anyway. But although it may seem that no real person has to bear these burdens when they are imposed onto insurers, in reality all of society bears them collectively when insurers are forced to hike their premiums to cover these increasing damages payments. In any case, it seems unfair to force insurers to cover these costs simply because they can afford to do so. If such an expansion is indeed the cause of the PL&I crisis, then a contraction of the scope of tort liability, and a pious return to the fault principle, might remedy the situation. However it could also be argued that inadequate deterrence is the cause of this crisis. On this account the problem would lie not with the tort system’s continued unwarranted expansion, but in the fact that defendants really have been too careless. If prospective injurers were appropriately deterred from engaging in unnecessarily risky activities, then fewer accidents would ever occur in the first place, and this would reduce the need for litigation at its very source. If we take this to be the cause of tort law’s failure then our solution should aim to improve deterrence. Glen Robinson has argued that improved deterrence could be achieved if plaintiffs were allowed to sue defendants for wrongful exposure to ongoing risks of future harm, even in the absence of currently materialized losses. He argues that at least in toxic injury type cases the tortious creation of risk [should be seen as] an appropriate basis of liability, with damages being assessed according to the value of the risk, as an alternative to forcing risk victims to abide the outcome of
Similar books and articles
This paper is devoted to a complex set of issues relating to the functions of tort law in distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable risks. Often, such risks are brought about by deliberate organisational design choice. On many occasions, legislators and courts are called upon to assess which of these design choices are acceptable and which are not. By evaluating a number of recent legislative drafts and proposals I present an out-line of what seems to be becoming a standard of ‘organisational liability’ for organ-isational failure. Moreover, I put forward a threefold typology of risks in tort law which seems to go a long way in categorizing tort law cases involving organisational design risks. Finally, I call the reader’s attention to the fact that tort law is in need of rational recalibration with regard to the ‘ranking of risks’, as it seems that some risks are inconsistently categorized as either acceptable or unacceptable.
No categories
When accidents occur and people suffer injuries, who ought to bear the loss? Tort law offers a complex set of rules to answer this question, but up to now philosophers have offered little by way of analysis of these rules. In eight essays commissioned for this volume, leading legal theorists examine the philosophical foundations of tort law. Amongst the questions they address are the following: how are the notions at the core of tort practice (such as responsibility, fault, negligence, due care, and duty to repair) to be understood? Is an explanation based on a conception of justice feasible? How are concerns of distributive and corrective justice related? What amounts to an adequate explanation of tort law? This collection will be of interest to professionals and advanced students working in philosophy of law, social theory, political theory, and law, as well as anyone seeking a better understanding of tort law.
Tort law depends on three key concepts: causation, responsibility, and fault. However, I argue that the three key concepts are neither necessary, nor sufficient, for tort.
The evolution of comparative fault is among this generation's most important tort law developments. Today, nearly every state follows some form of the rule, seeking to better align liability with culpability. Despite this guiding premise, states have struggled to define comparative fault's boundaries within the context of doctrine that developed in an earlier era. Courts have addressed many issues as part of this effort. One question that has escaped significant attention, however, is whether comparative fault should apply in a fraud action. This Article asserts that comparative fault jurisdictions should not bar plaintiffs from recovering in fraud when they fail to establish justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation. Rather, courts should apply comparative fault principles and evaluate all parties' conduct in assessing damages. The Article begins by providing a brief overview of fraud, including the traditional element of justifiable reliance. It then considers the forces arrayed against the extension of comparative fault to fraud. These include the argument that justifiable reliance is merely a proxy for other elements of fraud, as well as courts' historical hesitation to apply comparative fault in any intentional tort claim or actions for purely economic harm. From there, the Article questions the status quo. It suggests that, in fact, some courts do take justifiable reliance seriously. It also notes that historical barriers to comparative fault's application in the area might be eroding. The Article then asserts that the application of comparative fault in fraud actions makes sense. It notes that policies relied upon by scholars who would limit the extension of comparative fault do not inherently apply in the area of fraud. More positively, the Article suggests that extending comparative fault to fraud would serve policies that led courts and legislatures to adopt comparative fault in the first place, as well as policies that underlie tort law generally. In sum, the refusal of courts to apply comparative fault to fraud is a vestige of an earlier day in which "all-or-nothing" rules dominated tort law. The policies that led to the development of comparative fault in almost every other area of tort law also deserve consideration in fraud.
No categories
This essay discusses unlimited insurance subrogation (UIS) as a means of improving the deterrence and compensation results of medical malpractice law. Under UIS, health care insureds could assign their entire potential medical malpractice claims to their first-party commercial and government insurers. UIS should improve deterrence by establishing first-party insurers as plaintiffs to confront liability insurers on the defense side, leading to more effective prosecution of meritorious claims and reducing meritless and unnecessary litigation. UIS should improve compensation outcomes by converting litigation cost- and risk- laden “tort insurance” into cheaper and enhanced first-party insurance. UIS also promises dynamic benefits through further reforms by contract between the first-party and liability insurers that would take charge of system. No UIS-related costs are apparent that would outweigh these benefits.
This paper considers how tort law should respond to scientific developments that improve our ability to connect toxic exposure to changes in human health. Starting from a normative position that encourages proof of traditional sine qua non causation, the paper suggests an allocation of cases between the tort system and legislatively-created compensation programs. With regard to the latter, the paper sets out guidelines that lawmakers can use when deciding whether to replace tort law. With regard to the former, the paper divides its recommendations into two categories, one for cases where plaintiffs have existing clinical symptoms of disease, and another where plaintiffs have only an increased risk of disease. Recognizing the gray area that exists between these two groups, the paper proposes burdens consistent with traditional causation rules to serve tort law's underlying goals.
No categories
The American tort system regularly conducts a sort of lottery in which plaintiffs try to name as many defendants in a tort action as they can in order to collect a large judgment from at least one of them. This procedure is encouraged under strict joint and several liability, which permits plaintiffs to recover greater damages from defendants - usually businesses - with less moral culpability for the tort than poorer defendants, who bear greater culpability. In a case involving the Disney Corporation and a negligent amusement park rider, for instance, Disney was forced to pay 86% of the court award to the plaintiff, even though the jury found the company to be only 1% liable for the injury. The legal principle of joint and several liability violates morality in several different ways. Even though the principle appears to be better in the short run for plaintiffs, I will show that it fails not only to satisfy utilitarianism, but compensatory justice as well. Hence, the legal principle of joint and several liability should be eliminated in favor of a better, fairer law, which I will briefly sketch at the end.
No categories
Should there be civil liability when a person who could easily and without risk rescue another fails to do so? It is argued that the failure to act does not cause the harm that follows, and that the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction provides no basis for liability. In spite of this, it is maintained that there can sometimes be a duty to rescue, and even a right to be rescued, even in the absence of a voluntary undertaking or an explicit assumption of responsibility.There are convincing arguments for some sort of legal recognition of a duty to rescue, but these arguments do not support tort liability. Nor is a case for tort liability made with the argument that a growth of tort law in this direction would be compatible with the values most centrally involved in the division between torts and contracts. Furthermore, there is a case against tort liability — namely, that the purpose of tort liability is to compensate, that there are certain sorts of situations in which compensation is apposite, and that failure to rescue does not fit into these categories. Criminal liability is the appropriate way for the law to recognize a duty to rescue.
The formative period in the history of contract and tort (in the second half of the nineteenth century) may be characterized by the cleavage of contract and tort around the concept of fault: tort modernized by moving from strict liability to a regime of “no liability without fault,” while contract moved toward strict liability. The opposing attitudes toward fault are puzzling at first glance. Nineteenth-century scholars of private law offered explanations for the opposition, reasoning that alternative ideas about fault account for the different character of state involvement in enforcing private law rights: tort law governs liabilities imposed by law on nonconsenting members of society (and thus, it should limit itself to fault-based conduct), while contract law governs bargained-for duties and liabilities of parties who exercise freedom of contract (and thus, liability voluntarily undertaken need not consider fault). These theories are problematic, especially because they cannot offer a complete account of contract or tort. Tort retains too much strict liability to be thought of as a regime of no liability without fault, and contract has too many fault-based rules to be conceived of through strict liability. While these justifications for the distinction between contract and tort were questioned in ensuing generations, they still structure much of the debate over the current boundary between contract and tort.
This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate.
I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort law’s compensatory decisions provide a legitimate norm against which no-fault’s decisions can be compared and criticized – doing so leads in a direction which is at odds with accident law reform advocates’ typical recommendations.
On my account, accident law should not just be reformed in line with no-fault’s principles, but rather it should be completely abandoned since the principles that protect no- fault systems from the conservatives’ two allegations are incompatible with retaining the category of accident law, they entail that no-fault systems are a form of social welfare and not accident law systems, and that under these systems serious deprivation – and to a lesser extent causal responsibility – should be conditions of eligibility to claim benefits.
Discussion of Nicole A. Vincent, Compensation for Mere Exposure to Risk
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