Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments

Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49 (2009)
Abstract
Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
Keywords Moral responsibility  Legal responsibility  Capacity-theoretic conception of responsibility  Capacitarian theory of responsibility  Mental capacity  Capacity responsibility  Neuroimaging  fMRI  Modal fallacy  Automatic functions  Theory to the best explanation
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References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer (2005). Reply: The Free Will Revolution. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):145 – 156.
Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett (2006). Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):3 – 12.

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