David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):111-26 (2009)
Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008:462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patently irresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such a capacity, but only to be earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have a history that testifies to this willingness. Although we may have good reasons to prefer to have such a capacity ourselves, and to associate ourselves with others who have it, at a conceptual level I do not think that such considerations support the claim that having this capacity is a necessary condition of being a responsible person in the virtue sense.
|Keywords||responsibility irresponsibility virtue character|
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicole A. Vincent (2010). On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):77-98.
Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Legal Responsibility Adjudication and the Normative Authority of the Mind Sciences. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
Elizabeth Shaw (2014). Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):1-20.
Nicole A. Vincent (2014). Restoring Responsibility: Promoting Justice, Therapy and Reform Through Direct Brain Interventions. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):21-42.
Nicole A. Vincent (forthcoming). A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-22.
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