Sensations and the language of thought

Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392 (2000)
I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis
Keywords Cognitive Science  Epistemology  Language  Sensation  Thought  Rey, G
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DOI 10.1080/09515080050128178
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John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.

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