The notion of consistency for partial belief

Philosophical Studies 102 (3):281 - 296 (2001)
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2004

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10.1023/a:1010309526393

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Susan Vineberg
Wayne State University

Citations of this work

Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Laws and symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Higher order degrees of belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.

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