David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):292-314 (2009)
In specifying the sensory evidence for perceptual belief, thinkers have either chosen a common perceptual idiom or have invented one of their own as a starting-point for their enquiries. It is becoming clearer that the choice harbours crucial, often disputable, assumptions. I compare two sorts of constructions, a variety of propositional ones and an objectual one, and I argue that the objectual idiom is indispensable in order to explain how a perceptual belief can arise out of what is not already a belief. This has implications not only for the question of how belief is generated from perceptual evidence, but also for various other controversies. I discuss two of these implications: the character of inferences from evidence, and basic belief.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael G. F. Martin (1993). The Rational Role of Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:71-88.
John McDowell (1998). Lecture I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience. Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):431-450.
Gerald Vision (1998). Perceptual Content. Philosophy 73 (3):395-427.
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