David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):43-75 (2008)
Interjections, such as those in the title, together with a few similar devices, when qualifying clauses expressing truth-conditions, or that such conditions have been satisfied, are entitled 'force-amplifiers'. Disputes between deflationary and inflationary truth-theories sometimes are assumed to turn on the supposed pivotal role that these devices are construed as playing in the interpretation of the clauses they qualify. I argue that they are not dispensable add-ons. Moreover, even in their absence the relevant clauses giving truth-conditions permit interpretations that are not deflationary-friendly. I maintain that this is a significant fact about the use to which writers put them. I then defend, a thesis about force-amplifiers that makes them indispensable to the interpretation of the relevant clauses, and that renders certain moves unavailable to popular deflationist treatments.
|Keywords||Deflationary Theories of Truth deflationism truth|
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