David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 29 (2):109-123 (2010)
Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p ’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail.
|Keywords||Constitution Correspondence Deflationism Intensionality Metaphysics Truth Truth-makers|
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References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Paul Horwich (1998). Truth. Clarendon Press.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
Scott Soames (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Gustavo Picazo (2014). Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory. Philosophia 42 (3):713-739.
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