Modern moral philosophy again: Isolating the promulgation problem

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):345–362 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There are different ways of understanding the place of virtue in ethics. I will be interested in certain of the most ambitious, those neo-Aristotelian views that take it that right action is action from and for the sake of virtue, that right practical reasoning is virtuous practical reasoning, that the virtues are corrective,[i] and that, as Philippa Foot put it, "not every man who has a virtue has something that is a virtue in him."[ii] Virtues regulate individual action and response (tending to produce right choice, right action, appropriate emotions or passions, and tending to be constituted in part by developed sensitivities to ethical salience).[iii] These excellences benefit their bearers (in some sense) and benefit others (in several senses). And virtue makes the human adult good qua human being.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
140 (#129,275)

6 months
9 (#290,637)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Candace Vogler
University of Chicago

References found in this work

Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Utilitarianism and the virtues.Philippa Foot - 1985 - Mind 94 (374):196-209.
The first person.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 45–65.

View all 11 references / Add more references