Moral normativity

Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095 (2013)
It is a platitude that morality is normative, but a substantive and interesting question whether morality is normative in a robust and important way; and although it is often assumed that morality is indeed robustly normative, that view is by no means uncontroversial, and a compelling argument for it is conspicuously lacking. In this paper, I provide such an argument. I argue, based on plausible claims about the relationship between moral wrongs and moral criticizability, and the relationship between criticizability and normative reasons, that moral facts necessarily confer normative reasons upon moral agents
Keywords Morality  Reasons  Normativity  Criticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0010-9
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.

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