David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095 (2013)
It is a platitude that morality is normative, but a substantive and interesting question whether morality is normative in a robust and important way; and although it is often assumed that morality is indeed robustly normative, that view is by no means uncontroversial, and a compelling argument for it is conspicuously lacking. In this paper, I provide such an argument. I argue, based on plausible claims about the relationship between moral wrongs and moral criticizability, and the relationship between criticizability and normative reasons, that moral facts necessarily confer normative reasons upon moral agents
|Keywords||Morality Reasons Normativity Criticism|
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References found in this work BETA
Philippa Foot (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
Richard Joyce (2001). The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
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