Morality, reasons, and sentiments

Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432 (2011)
Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral reasons are reasons for having sentiments—in particular, compassion and respect—and I argue that this view has important advantages over the standard view of moral normativity.
Keywords Morality  Normativity  Reasons  Humeanism  Sentiments  Compassion  Respect
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9579-z
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Eric Vogelstein (2013). Moral Normativity. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.

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