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Neural correlates of the first-person perspective
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):38-42 (2003)
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Citations of this work
Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.Jakub Limanowski & Felix Blankenburg - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
Cortical midline structures and the self.Georg Northoff & Felix Bermpohl - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):102-107.
The shared circuits model. How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation and mind reading.Susan Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind.Albert Newen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
References found in this work
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Antonio Damasio - 1999 - Harcourt Brace and Co.
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery.Marc Jeannerod - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):187-202.
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Mark Johnson - 2001 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 15 (4):323-326.
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