Reliabilism leveled

Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Generic reliabilism and virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:79-92.
Reliabilism—modal, probabilistic or contextualist.Peter Baumann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):77-89.
You Can Always Count on Reliabilism.Michael Levin - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607-617.
Simple reliabilism and agent reliabilism. [REVIEW]Jonathan Kvanvig - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):451–456.
Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reliabilism and deflationism.James R. Beebe - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
Agent reliabilism.John Greco - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:273-296.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
362 (#52,437)

6 months
31 (#98,153)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Vogel
Amherst College

Citations of this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.
Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

View all 128 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.

Add more references