Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88 (2007)
Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily satisfied. A powerful motivation for adopting subjunctivism would be that it provides a solution to the problem of misleading evidence, but in fact, it does not.
Keywords Safety  Sensitivity  Tracking  Nozick  De Rose  Sosa  Reliablism  Misleading evidence  Contextualism  Closure Principle  Knowledge  Induction
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DOI 10.2307/40208704
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.

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