David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88 (2007)
Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily satisfied. A powerful motivation for adopting subjunctivism would be that it provides a solution to the problem of misleading evidence, but in fact, it does not.
|Keywords||Safety Sensitivity Tracking Nozick De Rose Sosa Reliablism Misleading evidence Contextualism Closure Principle Knowledge Induction|
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Citations of this work BETA
Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2010). Dogmatism Repuzzled. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.
Ron Wilburn (2010). Possible Worlds of Doubt. Acta Analytica 25 (2):259-277.
Similar books and articles
Avram Hiller & Ram Neta (2007). Safety and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146 (3):395 - 404.
Christoph Kelp (2009). Knowledge and Safety. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.
Dani Rabinowitz, &Quot;the Safety Condition for Knowledge&Quot;. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter Murphy (2005). Closure Failures for Safety. Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
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