Subjective Reasons

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257 (2012)
Abstract
In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to view reasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is that reasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons are determined by the facts, while subjective reasons are determined by one's beliefs. My goal in this paper is to offer a plausible theory of subjective reasons. Although much attention has been focused on theories of objective reasons, very little has been offered in the literature regarding what sort of account of subjective reasons we should adopt; and what has been offered is rather perfunctory, and requires filling-out. Taking what has been said thus far as a starting point, I will consider several putative theories of subjective reasons, offering objections and amendments along the way, will settle on what I take to be a highly plausible account, and will defend that account against objections
Keywords Reasons  Subjective reasons  Normativity
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References found in this work BETA
Keith Frankish (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keith Frankish (2009). Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 75--93.

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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Vogelstein (2013). Moral Normativity. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.
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