Plantinga a princip slábnoucí pravděpodobnosti

Studia Neoaristotelica 6 (1):50-78 (2009)
Abstract
De Plantingae circa “principium decrescentis probabilitatis” doctrinaAlvin Plantinga criticam rationum historicarum pro fidei Christianae medullam proposuit, quae calculo probabilitatis innititur. Principium, super quod critica eius fundatur, est, probabilitatem argumenti vel conciunctionis propositionum in proportione ad eius complexitatem decrescere: quo quidem magis complexum sit argumentum, eo improbabilior. Dissertatio nostra elementa epistomologicae doctrinae Plantingae atque “calculi probabilitatis” exponit, indicando quoque partem eius in epistemologia hodierna. Deinde notio “boni argumenti” introducitur et explicatur, quomodo et cur secundum Plantingam nullum datur argumentum bonum pro fide Christiana. Deinde responsiones variae ad Plantingam perscrutantur. Ex quo potest concludi primo, probabilitatem inefficaciae omnium argumentorum pro fide Christiana posse esse parvam. Secundo, licet universa fides Christiana sit minus probabilis quam eius partes, probabilissima tamen potest esse, sive augeatur summa rationum quibus innititur, sive minus. Postremo, dantur subtilia argumenta ex probabilitate pro Christianam fidem,quarum efficacia tamen satis differt ab illa, quam Plantinga cursim aestimavit. Translatio: Lukáš NovákPlantinga and the Principle of Dwindling ProbabilitiesAlvin Plantinga wrote a probabilistic critique of historical arguments for the kernel of Christianity. It is based on the fact that, generally, the more complex a conjunction, the lower its probability. The paper provides elementary insights into the epistemology of Plantinga, probability calculus, and the role of this calculus in contemporary epistemology. It introduces a concept of a good argument, explains in which sense and why, according to Plantinga, no good arguments for Christianity exist, and discusses the following replies. The probability that every argument for Christianity fails can be low. Even if Christianity is less probable than its proper propositional parts, it can be still be probable, whether on the same or on some enhanced body of evidence. Finally, there have been detailed probabilistic arguments for Christianity yielding results significantly different from Plantinga’s cursory estimates
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