Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441 (2006)
|Abstract||In his recent book on the philosophy of mind,1 Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further be freed from a certain tension that seems to affect it, namely the fact that he appeals to nonexistent intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states and at the same time he attempts at dispensing with them.|
|Keywords||Intentional Metaphysics Mind Object Crane, Tim|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tim Crane (1992). Numbers and Propositions: Reply to Melia. Analysis 52 (4):253-256.
Olga Markić (2004). Crane on the Mind-Body Problem and Emergence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):199-205.
Ana Gavran (2004). Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.
Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Daniel Seymour (1993). Some of the Difference in the World: Crane on Intentional Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (170):83-89.
Tim Crane (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1).
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #16,406 of 549,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?