Are there non-existent intentionalia?

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441 (2006)
Abstract
In his recent book on the philosophy of mind,1 Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further be freed from a certain tension that seems to affect it, namely the fact that he appeals to nonexistent intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states and at the same time he attempts at dispensing with them.
Keywords Intentional  Metaphysics  Mind  Object  Crane, Tim
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    References found in this work BETA
    C. B. Martin & Karl Pfeifer (1986). Intentionality and the Non-Psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):531-54.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
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