Compositional supervenience without compositional meaning?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In M. De Glas & Z. Pawlak (eds.), WOCFAI 95. Second World Conference on the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence, 3-7 July 1995. Angkor. 441-452 (1995)
An attempt is first made to clarify why Stephen Schiffer may legitimately claim that his noncompositional account of meaning differs from other non-compositional semantic doctrines such as the hidden-indexical theory of propositional attitudes. Subsequently, however, doubt is cast upon Schiffer's main contention that, as far as language of thought is concerned, a compositional supervenience theory can adequately satisfy all the desiderata a compositional meaning theory is traditionally called upon for. This doubt basically depends on the fact that, once a physical property is assigned by the compositional supervenience theory to the relevant nominal constituent of a Mentalese attitude report as the basic element on which the physical property assigned to the whole report depends, such a property precisely plays the role of a mode of presentation of the referent of that constituent. Finally, the following dilemma is arisen: in order to account for the meaning of attitude reports either the dismissal of modes of presentation or the rejection of compositionality is to be given up.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes. Cognition 58 (2):253-70.
Dag Westerståhl (2004). On the Compositional Extension Problem. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):549-582.
Peter Pagin (forthcoming). Communication and the Complexity of Semantics. In W. Hinzen, E. Machery & Werning (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Compositionality.
Douglas Patterson (2005). Learnability and Compositionality. Mind and Language 20 (3):326–352.
Lenny Clapp (2012). Is Even Thought Compositional? Philosophical Studies 157 (2):299-322.
Louise Antony (1991). A Pieced Quilt: A Critical Discussion of Stephen Schiffer'sRemnants of Meaning. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):119-137.
Stephen R. Schiffer (1991). Does Mentalese Have a Compositional Semantics? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Wlodek Zadrozny (1994). From Compositional to Systematic Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (4):329 - 342.
Stephen Schiffer (1993). Compositional Supervenience Theories and Compositional Meaning Theories. Analysis 53 (1):24 - 29.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #354,163 of 1,102,718 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?