Erkenntnis 61 (1):75-98 (2004)
|Abstract||There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make these terms referentially indirect under the second interpretation. This result is then generalized to proper names, by ascribing them a normative meaning as well.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Public Proper Names, Idiolectal Identifying Descriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):317-326.
Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
John Perry (1997). Reflexivity, Indexicality and Names. In W. Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Csli.
Alberto Voltolini, Critical Notice Of: François Recanati, Direct Reference (Oxford:Blackwell, 1993).
Matthew Davidson (2000). Direct Reference and Singular Propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):285 - 300.
Robin Jeshion (2009). The Significance of Names. Mind and Language 24 (4):370-403.
Jaakko Hintikka & Gabriel Sandu (1995). The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference. Synthese 104 (2):245 - 283.
Emar Maier (2009). Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions. Journal of Semantics 26:253-315.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #87,849 of 549,013 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,013 )
How can I increase my downloads?