David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 58 (1):13 - 31 (2003)
There is a widespread opinion that the realist idea that whether a proposition is true or false typically depends on how things are independently of ourselves is bound to turn truth, in Davidson's words, into something to which humans can never legitimately aspire. This opinion accounts for the ongoing popularity of epistemic theories of truth, that is, of those theories that explain what it is for a proposition (or statement, or sentence, or what have you) to be true or false in terms of some epistemic notion, such as provability, justifiability, verifiability, rational acceptability, warranted assertibility, and so forth, in some suitably characterized epistemic situation. My aim in this paper is to show that the widespread opinion is erroneous and that the (legitimate) epistemological preoccupation with the accessibility of truth does not warrant the rejection of the realist intuition that truth is, at least for certain types of propositions, radically nonepistemic.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2005). Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy. Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
Cristina Lafont (1995). Dilemas En Torno a la Verdad. Theoria 10 (2):109-124.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Murat Baç (2004). Can Realists Know That They Know? Acta Analytica 19 (32):65-90.
James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
María Ponte Azcárate (2007). A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.
John Nolt (2008). Truth as an Epistemic Ideal. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):203 - 237.
Tadeusz Szubka (2002). Truth as Correct Assertibility: An Intermediate Position? Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):157-171.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #80,649 of 1,010,216 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,700 of 1,010,216 )
How can I increase my downloads?