Is it merely loose talk?
|Abstract||As is well known, the puzzle of the unreplaceability salva veritate of allegedly co-designative directly referential terms (DRTs) within attitude reports differing just for such terms, the opacity puzzle, traditionally constitutes one of the main troubles for the theory of direct reference. According to this theory, a DRT contributes merely its referent to the truth-conditions of the sentence in which it occurs. But if report-embedded DRTs yielded merely this truth-conditional contribution, reports of the above kind would have to possess the same truth-conditions, hence there should be no problem of preserving truth across them. Thus, how can it be that truth cannot be preserved across such reports, at least in their so-called ‘opaque’ reading? Faced with this puzzle , a direct reference theorist is left with various possible solutions to it, which can be roughly gathered into two main groups: the complex and the simple ones1. I call the former solutions complex, for they constrain the direct reference theorist to invoke different modes of presentation (MPs) of one and the same referent of the embedded DRTs as being involved within the reports’ different truth-conditions (in several ways)2. The simple solutions are instead characterized by the fact that they do not involve MPs in the truth-conditional account of the reports. Among such solutions, I..|
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