Why information ethics must begin with virtue ethics

Metaphilosophy 41 (3):380-401 (2010)
Abstract
Abstract: The information ethics (IE) of Floridi and Sanders is evaluated here in the light of an alternative in virtue ethics that is antifoundationalist, particularist, and relativist in contrast to Floridi's foundationalist, impartialist, and universalist commitments. Drawing from disparate traditional sources like Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Emerson, as well as contemporary advocates of virtue ethics like Nussbaum, Foot, and Williams, the essay shows that the central contentions of IE, including especially the principle of ontological equality, must either express commitments grounded in the particular perspectives we already inhabit, or be without rational or ethical force for us.
Keywords virtue ethics  particularism  foundationalism  ethical individualism  information ethics
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References found in this work BETA
Philip Brey (2008). Do We Have Moral Duties Towards Information Objects? Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):109-114.
Luciano Floridi (2008). Information Ethics: A Reappraisal. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):189-204.

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