Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Barbara Partee is reported to have said that she never was sure whether the complement of an attitude verb should be a sentence or a proposition, where proposition is to be understood in a pre-theoretical sense as sentence meaning. In this paper we take up the question by investigation a suggestion made by David Kaplan in (Kaplan, 1977), viz. that the complement of an attitude is in fact a proposition, which is described by some character. Our answer to Partee's question is that the complement of a de re attitude is both a proposition and a sentence.|
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