Armstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties
| Abstract | David Armstrong has argued that the properties of a thing are parts of it and predications are necessary. This article criticises this view and presents and alternative. | |||||||||
| Keywords | David Armstrong properties predication modality | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDavid Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
M. Eddon (2007). Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):385 - 404.
Laird Addis (1967). Particulars and Acquaintance. Philosophy of Science 34 (3):251-259.
Daniel von Wachter (2004). The Ontological Turn Misunderstood: How to Misunderstand David Armstrong’s Theory of Possibility. Metaphysica 5:105-114.
Joan Pagès (2002). Structural Universals and Formal Relations. Synthese 131 (2):215 - 221.
Alexander Bird (2006). Potency and Modality. Synthese 149 (3):447-52.
David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
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