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  • Daniel von Wachter, Armstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties.
    David Armstrong has argued that the properties of a thing are parts of it and predications are necessary. This article criticises this view and presents and alternative.
    Properties, Misc in Metaphysics
    Universals in Metaphysics
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  • 115.5David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
    Dispositional and Categorical Properties in Metaphysics
    Universals in Metaphysics
    Tropes in Metaphysics
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  • 92.5Alexander Bird (2006). Potency and Modality. Synthese 149 (3):447-52.
    Let us call a property that is essentially dispositional a potency.1 David Armstrong thinks that potencies do not exist. All sparse properties are essentially categorical, where sparse properties are the explanatory properties of the type science seeks to discover. An alternative view, but not the only one, is that all sparse properties are potencies or supervene upon them. In this paper I shall consider the differences between these views, in particular the objections Armstrong raises against potencies.
    Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic in Metaphysics
    Powers in Metaphysics
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  • 78.5Joan Pagés (2002). Structural Universals and Formal Relations. Synthese 131 (2).
    I will consider Armstrong''s problems in trying to account for structural universals,i.e., a kind of complex universal whose instantiation by particulars involves differentparts of those particulars instantiating several basic properties and relations, such asthe property of being a molecule of methane. I present and criticise Armstrong''s mostrecent attempt to explain structural properties by means of the identification of universals with types of states of affairs and I state my own solution to the problem by appealing to formal relations holding between (...) particulars. (shrink)
    Universals in Metaphysics
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  • 72.4David Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26:25-37.
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  • 70.9Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are (...) good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the.. (shrink)
    Supervenient Causation in Metaphysics
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  • 68.4Maya Eddon (forthcoming). Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance. Philosophical Studies.
    Resemblances obtain not only between objects but between properties. Resemblances of the latter sort – in particular resemblances between quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of a well-known theory of universals, namely the one presented by David Armstrong. This paper examines Armstrong’s efforts to account for such resemblances within the framework of his theory and also explores several extensions of that theory. All of them fail.
    Universals in Metaphysics
    Natural Properties in Metaphysics
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  • 68.1Philipp Keller, A World of Truthmakers.
    I will present and criticise the two theories of truthmaking David Armstrong offers us in Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), show to what extent they are incompatible and identify troublemakers for both of them, a notorious – Factualism, the view that the world is a world of states of affairs – and a more recent one – the view that every predication is necessary. Factualism, combined with truthmaker necessitarianism – ‘truthmaking is necessitation’ – leads Armstrong to an all-embracing totality state (...) of affairs that necessitates not only everything that is the case but also everything else – that which is not the case, that which is merely possible or even impossible. All the things so dear to realists – rocks, natural properties, real persons – become mere abstractions from this ontological monster. The view that every predication is necessary does in some sense the opposite: it does away with totality states of affairs and, arguably, also with states of affairs. We have particulars and universals, partially identical and necessarily connected to everything else. Just by the existence of anything, everything is necessitated – the whole world mirrored in every monad. Faced with the choice between these two equally unappealing alternatives, I suggest returning to Armstrong’s more empiricist past: the world is not an all-inclusive One, nor necessitated by every single particular and every single universal, but a plurality of particulars and universals, interconnected by a contingent and internal relation of exemplification. While a close variant, truthmaker essentialism, can perhaps be saved, this means giving up on truthmaker necessitarianism. This, I think, what it takes to steer a clear empiricist course between the Scylla of Spinozist general factness and the Charybdis of a Leibnizian overdose of brute necessities. (shrink)
    Truthmakers in Metaphysics
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  • 67.7Daniel Stoljar (2007). Distinctions in Distinction. In Jesper Kallestrup & Jakob Hohwy (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences. Oxford University Press.
    1.Puzzle According to a standard view in contemporary metaphysics, there are no necessary connections between distinct properties. But according to a standard view in philosophy of mind there are necessary connections between distinct properties. In short, we have a puzzle: standard metaphysics inconsistent with standard philosophy of mind. By ‘a standard view in contemporary metaphysics’ I mean, of course, Hume’s dictum that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. I don’t mean the historical Hume; whether the historical Hume held (...) Hume’s dictum I am sure is a controversial issue, and will not concern us. What will concern us rather is the idea that contemporary metaphysicians such as David Lewis and David Armstrong discuss and attribute to Hume (see, e.g., Lewis 1986 and Armstrong 1997). Of course Hume’s dictum does not say anything explicitly about properties; it talks of existences rather than properties. But ‘existences’ I take it, means ‘things that exist’ and, if we set nominalism aside—as I will do here—properties are things that exist. Hence the Humean dictum entails as a special case that there are no necessary connections between distinct properties. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 66.2Bjørn Jespersen (2008). Predication and Extensionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5).
    In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. (...) Instead I recommend we follow Pavel Tichý in construing both predication and extensionalization as instances of the primitive operation of functional application. (shrink)
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
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  • 66.1Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...) and to identify properties with functions from world, time pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating. (shrink)
    Properties, Misc in Metaphysics
    Property Nominalism in Metaphysics
    Three- and Four-Dimensionalism in Metaphysics
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